John Van Oudenaren is the author of the new book The Geopolitics of Culture: James Billington, the Library of Congress, and the Failed Quest for a New Russia. It focuses on the role Billington (1929-2018), the former librarian of Congress, played in U.S.-Russian relations. Van Oudenaren's other books include Crisis and Renewal. He is a Global Fellow at the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, and was director of the World Digital Library and chief of the European Division at the Library of Congress.
Q: What inspired you to write The Geopolitics of Culture?
A: I thought it was an important story that needed to be told.
The Library of Congress did amazing things in and with Russia under [James] Billington’s leadership: helping a major library in St. Petersburg recover from a devasting fire, preserving and making accessible to scholars through digitization and microfilming the records of the Soviet communist party and the international communist movement, launching large-scale exchanges of people and of books, organizing conferences, helping the Russians to create their first digital libraries, and jointly organizing film projects, concerts, exhibitions, and scholarly conferences.
These activities reached ordinary Russians and helped the Russian cultural sector get back on its feet after it was decimated by the collapse of the Soviet economy.
There was also a political reason for writing the book. Putin has cultivated a myth among the Russian people that in the 1990s the West, led by the United States, set out to destroy Russia and its culture.
This is of course not true. Western governments and organizations made enormous efforts in the 1990s and beyond to help Russia create a prosperous market economy and a stable political system. Mistakes were made, to be sure, but the claim that U.S. intentions were malign is a lie.
The Library of Congress wasn’t by any means the biggest provider of outside assistance to Russia, but it played an especially important role. It helped to preserve and showed respect for Russian culture at a time when many Russians felt humiliated by their poverty and when Russian economic, political, and military power was at a low point.
Gorbachev and Yeltsin both acknowledged what the Library of Congress had done, and Putin seemed to acknowledge it in the early 2000s, when he had several long meetings with Billington and the two men discussed Russian culture and identity.
But later, when Putin turned hostile to the West, he developed a mythology about Russia being a 1,000-year-old culture that the West is out to destroy and that Russia needs to “defend,” including through actions like the invasion of Ukraine.
I don’t know how and when the truths that I document in the book will make their way into Russia, but I am confident that someday they will, if they haven’t already. But the first step to having the truth known is to document it thoroughly with sources and evidence.
Q: How did you research the book, and did you learn anything that especially intrigued you?
A: I started with published sources – newsletters, annual reports, press releases, and so forth, as well as Billington’s own voluminous writings, including his books, op-ed pieces in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and elsewhere, and his speeches, articles, and congressional testimony.
I also used a lot of unpublished archival sources – from various offices and divisions in the Library of Congress, the Billington Papers at the Library of Congress, as well as papers at the Reagan and Clinton presidential libraries, and at Harvard, Princeton, and Yale. I did interviews with former and current Library of Congress staff.
I was personally involved in much of what is covered in the book, so I drew on my own memory, but I always tried to check against written sources, because memory can play tricks.
Lots of things intrigued me. Personal relationships were interesting.
For example, the friendship between Billington and the poet Joseph Brodsky. Billington loved poetry, American and Russian, and he selected Brodsky to be poet laureate of the United States at around the time the Soviet Union was collapsing.
Billington was by profession a cultural historian, and he had great hopes that once the communists were gone a classical Russian culture would reemerge.
He saw Brodsky as the embodiment of this revived Russian culture, not only because of his poetic genius but because in the 1960s Brodsky had been the protégé of the two last great survivors of pre-Bolshevik Russian culture: the poet Anna Akhmatova and the writer Nadezhda Mandelstam, widow of the poet Osip Mandelstam who had died in the gulag.
Brodsky was flattered to be cast in this role, but he didn’t believe it for a minute. The correspondence between the men shows that Brodsky thought that post-communist Russia would be dominated by thugs and gangsters of various kinds – “city boys” he called them – rather than a revived Russian Orthodox Church, thriving rural communities, and a Russian cultural renaissance, such as Billington was hoping for. In this, unfortunately, Brodsky was right and Billington wrong.
Billington’s relationship with Nancy Reagan was another surprise. They had worked together on the June 1988 Gorbachev-Reagan summit, when he arranged her cultural program in Moscow and St. Petersburg. They kept in touch, and I found in his papers a copy of a long handwritten letter to her.
This struck me as a quaint reminder of a lost world: good penmanship. My handwriting is so bad I can barely leave a note for the dry cleaners, let alone write a long letter to a former first lady. But he seemed fine with sending it and she obviously read it and replied!
I guess the other surprise was to realize, belatedly, what a coherent world view Billington had – one encompassing culture, religion, politics, international relations.
I used to write a lot for him – mostly speeches and letters – and he was generally satisfied with what I wrote, because I understood his world view and could feed it back to him when he didn’t have the time to do the writing himself.
But it wasn’t until I sat down, amidst the pandemic, and read through pretty much everything he had ever written that I realized what a consistent, coherent world view he had, one that I guess he developed at Princeton and Oxford in the late 1940s and early 1950s.
The experience has made me think more seriously about intellectual biography as a genre and to wonder who else that I know or know of had this kind of unified world view.
Q: How would you describe James Billington’s legacy when it comes to relations between the U.S. and Russia, and what do you think he would say about today's interactions between the two countries?
A: Well, he got some things right and some things very wrong. He was obviously correct in warning, as he did in the 1990s and early 2000s, that the heavy focus of Western policymakers on economic reform – shock therapy, rapid privatization, and so forth – was discrediting the United States and dissipating the good will that ordinary Russians felt toward Americans after the fall of communism.
He was right to draw attention to neglected psychological and cultural aspects that Putin has since seized upon in a twisted way to stir up Russian hatred toward the West.
But he was clearly wrong about Putin. In the early days he argued that Putin was a kind of Charles de Gaulle – a patriot who would use nationalism and mildly authoritarian means to revive Russia and help it recover from national humiliation in the way de Gaulle had helped France after its defeat in World War II.
At most he warned that Putin might became (or might be superseded by) a Milosevic – the Serbian leader who exploited Serb nationalism to maintain his power. But as we now know, Putin turned out to be a thousand times worse than Milosevic – in the deaths and destruction he has caused and may yet cause as the war in Ukraine grinds on.
Were he alive today, Billington would be appalled by what has happened in Russia and at the state of U.S.-Russia relations.
He always saw post-communist Russia as engaged in a struggle between forces of light and forces of darkness, but he was an optimist by nature and believed that the forces of light would prevail.
But that clearly has not happened. What has happened – the invasion of Ukraine, the perversion of the Orthodox Church, the war crimes committed in Bucha and elsewhere, the murder of political dissidents and suppression of freedoms – is worse than the worst outcomes that Billington warned about in the 1990s and early 2000s and argued that Western policy needed to work to prevent. He would be very disappointed.
The positive legacy of Billington’s work is his teaching and constant reminders that in dealing with foreign countries we need to pay greater attention to cultural and psychological factors and to these countries’ histories and traditions.
We can’t just bribe or bomb or badger them into becoming liberal democracies as we tried for the first decades after the collapse of communism. But neither should we give up on trying to have a positive moral and political influence on the rest of the world, as seems to be the approach of the current administration.
Billington was always searching for a middle path between these two extremes – between on the one hand expecting everyone would eventually become just like us because of McDonald’s and the internet, and on the other of being indifferent to circumstances in other countries and maybe even preferring autocracies to democracies because they can be easier to deal with.
In the book I argue that these are lessons from his work that we need to incorporate into our foreign policy if we are to survive in this increasingly complex and in some ways more hostile world.
Q: How was the book’s title chosen, and what does it signify for you?
A: Well, there are two parts to it – the “geopolitics” and the “culture.” Billington was part of that generation of American thinkers who had come of age during and just after World War II.
They were taught that the United States had fought two wars in the first half of the 20th century to prevent a single hostile power from dominating the Eurasian land mass and its industrial and population resources.
Woodrow Wilson had reluctantly entered World War I to prevent a German victory, and Franklin D. Roosevelt was determined to stave off a British defeat at the hands of the Axis.
The cold war that began in the late 1940s was yet another struggle to keep a single, hostile power – in this case the Soviet Union allied with China – from dominating Eurasia.
The United States won a spectacular victory in 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed and the cold war ended.
But Billington always warned that there was nothing permanent about this victory and that the United States needed to head off the emergence of a new coalition of hostile powers, most likely comprising China, Russia, and some of the Islamic states, that would dominate Eurasia and threaten U.S. interests and security.
That was one reason why he was so committed to trying to build a democratic Russia friendly to the United States. Well, fast forward to the 2020s, and that’s exactly what has happened.
There’s no need to go into the details here, but somehow we have blundered our way from the overwhelmingly favorable position we inherited in 1991 to one in which we are facing what some are calling an “axis of autocracies” comprised of Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. Billington saw this as a possibility and wanted to head it off.
The Trump administration is now trying to pry Russia away from China, much the way Henry Kissinger broke China away from the Soviet Union in the 1970s. In theory there’s nothing wrong with this idea, but I doubt it will work.
And if the price of winning over Russia is to sell Ukraine and Europe down the river, then it’s hardly a net gain – indeed it would be a major loss.
As for culture: Today’s geopolitical rivalry is mostly about hard economic and military power, but it does have a cultural dimension. The United States and its allies won the Cold War in part because they won the war of ideas.
They were able to convince the world’s people that the West stood for cultural and intellectual pluralism – for the free flourishing of different ideas, religions, and art forms – while the communists enforced a bland orthodoxy based on Marxist ideology.
Well, that script has now been flipped. Putin, Xi Jinping, and the ayatollahs of Iran have now assumed the mantle of cultural pluralism; they claim to be the protectors of ancient civilizations going back millennia, while the United States leads a decadent West that is trying to wipe out traditional cultures around the world and impose a sameness that flows out of Hollywood and Silicon Valley.
This view is of course nonsense – I don’t know enough about Iran and China to judge, but I do know that Putin’s version of Russian culture is a sham that chokes off genuine intellectual, artistic and religious freedom.
But there’s a lot of sympathy for this view, in the autocracies themselves, in the Global South, and unfortunately even in the West where some people are willing to overlook Putin’s crimes and see Russia as some kind of model civilization.
Billington (and a few other thinkers, for example the great Sam Huntington at Harvard) saw this coming and wanted to head it off.
Billington’s approach at the Library of Congress, which I happened to see firsthand, was to demonstrate to other countries and cultures that we respected them – that we were not out to impose a Western monoculture on them and that they did not need to turn to dictators to preserve values that they held dear.
It was an uphill battle, but we made a lot of progress in Russia – just not enough.
So that – geopolitical rivalry with a cultural dimension – is why I entitled the book the “geopolitics of culture.” In the concluding chapter I draw lessons from Billington’s thinking that we might apply in the future as we try to get out of our current geopolitical predicament.
Q: What are you working on now?
A: I am writing a history of the Open World program, which is one of the programs discussed in The Geopolitics of Culture. It began as an exchange program that Billington initiated with the support of Congress in 1999, aimed at heading off the deterioration of U.S.-Russia relations that already then was underway.
The program ultimately brought 20,000 Russians in leadership positions to the United States. It later expanded to Ukraine and other countries in Eurasia and continues to this day (although without Russian participation) under the auspices of the Congressional Office of International Leadership (COIL).
Based on the earlier book, COIL has asked me to write a more detailed history of this exchange program, which I was happy to do.
The book will be a history, but I’m also trying to get at some broader, more conceptual questions: what role can people-to-people exchanges play in promoting U.S. interests overseas? What kind of exchanges (youth, professional, cultural) work best? How can we use exchanges to bolster countries such as Ukraine that are under attack by Russia, and what role might such exchanges play in rebuilding, down the road, some kind of relationship with a post-Putin Russia?
I’m also putting on my political science hat to do some work on Europe. I’ve written books on the EU in the past. The EU can be bureaucratic and boring, but it’s now getting very interesting as Macron, Merz, Starmer, and a few others are stepping up – working to ensure their security and their prosperity in what many are calling a post-American world.
Q: Anything else we should know?
A: I would just like to thank this blog and Deborah Kalb for this opportunity to discuss this book. As readers who are book lovers and writers know, the economics of book publishing are pretty daunting these days, and anything that supports independent and academic presses ultimately helps authors.
The Geopolitics of Culture is available at Amazon, but a better bet is to purchase directly from Cornell University Press. Here is the link:
https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9781501775765/the-geopolitics-of-culture/#bookTabs=1
By typing the discount code 09BCARD in at checkout, you take 30 percent off the price (electronic or print edition).
--Interview with Deborah Kalb