William G. Howell |
William G. Howell and Terry M. Moe are the authors of the new book Relic: How Our Constitution Undermines Effective Government and Why We Need a More Powerful Presidency. Howell is the Sydney Stein Professor in American Politics at the University of Chicago, and Moe is the William Bennett Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.
Q: You
describe Congress as "an irresponsible, ineffective policymaker...due to
its constitutional design," and to the Constitution as "a relic of
the past." What are some of the reasons you think Congress's design has
become problematic, and at what point do you think the Constitution became
"a relic"?
A: …Often,
Congress is unable to take any action at all in addressing key social
problems—immigration, for instance—because special interests, aided by the
Constitution’s separation of powers, can find ways of blocking.
Terry M. Moe |
But when
Congress does act, it tends to produce weak, cobbled-together policies that are
designed to attract political support from disparate legislators, not to
provide coherent, intellectually justifiable solutions to the nation’s problems.
This sort of
thing may have been okay in 1789 for a small agrarian nation in which
government wasn’t expected to do much, and didn’t do much.
But 21st century
America is an exceedingly modern, postindustrial, highly interconnected,
fast-changing country that is awash in serious social problems—from terrorism
to globalization to pollution to drugs to poverty—that government, nearly all
agree, is fully expected to address.
The founders
had no idea that any of this would happen, and so the government they designed
was never intended to tackle the problems of modern times.
To be sure,
the Constitution did not become a relic overnight. And in many ways, the
Constitution has served our country well.
But as our
population grew, as our economy became more vibrant and sophisticated, as our
stature in the world escalated, a chasm opened up between what our political
institutions were designed to do and what nearly all citizens called upon them
to do.
We can’t put
an exact date on when the Constitution became a relic. But it is reasonable to
say that, by 1900 or so—when the nation was fast becoming an industrial,
urbanized nation—the Constitution was way out of sync with American society,
and governance problems were already quite severe. Since then, the chasm has only widened and
deepened, and the governance problems have gotten worse.
Q: You
propose making presidents "more central" to the political process and
Congress "less central." Why do you think that will improve the
process?
A: …First, [presidents]
are truly national leaders with national constituencies driven to solve national
problems, and they are far less likely than legislators to become captive to
narrow or local special-interest pressures. Their policy agendas won’t please
everyone. And they aren’t perfect. But
compared to members of Congress, they are paragons of national leadership.
Second, presidents
have reached the pinnacle of their professional lives, and they are invariably motivated
by their legacies—which turn on their success in crafting durable, effective
policy solutions to important national problems….
[But] the Constitution
places heavy constraints on presidential power—and thus makes it virtually
impossible for the system to take advantage of what presidents have to offer as
the champions of effective government.
Major
strides can be achieved, however, without a radical transformation of the
Constitution and a risky leap into the unknown. Under the reform we’re
proposing, the Constitution remains basically the same. So does Congress. So
does separation of powers.
The reform
involves a simple, low-risk constitutional amendment that changes the way
policy decisions get made—by moving presidents to the center of the policy
process, and moving Congress to the periphery where its pathologies can do less
damage.
Specifically,
we propose a constitutional amendment that grants presidents universal “fast
track” authority. The nation has 40 years of positive experience with fast
track in international trade, and that same familiar model would simply be
applied to all legislation.
Presidents
would craft policy proposals—which are likely to be far more coherent, well
integrated, and effective than anything Congress would design—and Congress
would be required to vote up or down on those proposals, within a specified
period of time and on a majoritarian basis.
Congress would retain the authority to pass laws on its own, but presidents
would retain the authority to veto them.
Q: You
write, "Presidents are the champions of coherence and effectiveness in a
fragmented, parochial political world." Looking at the two major party
nominees, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump, what would conceivably happen under
a President Clinton or a President Trump were your proposal somehow to come
into effect?
A: Whether
Clinton or Trump wins the presidency surely matters. Among other things, these two people would
pursue extraordinarily different policy agendas.
But fast
track authority does not even remotely guarantee that the winner would get
exactly what she or he wants. Both houses of Congress would still need to vote
yes before any proposal becomes law, and the court system and separation of
powers would remain intact as checks on presidential power, as would the Bill
of Rights.
A President
Clinton or President Trump would still be highly constrained, with strong
incentives to compromise, and with no additional powers of unilateral action.
The
difference with fast track, then, is not that the new president would suddenly
become a dictator. The difference is that, when policies do pass, they stand to
be much better designed and more effective than the weak, cobbled-together
mish-mashes that Congress long been cranking out.
This may be
little consolation to partisans on both sides. Clinton’s supporters may say that
they hate Trump’s policies, and thus are opposed to anything that promotes effectiveness
for a Trump presidency. Trump’s
supporters may say the same about Clinton and her policies.
Put the two
together and it points to a governmental system that is always
ineffective—because it must be in order to keep the “bad guys” from ever doing
anything.
But this is
a narrow, short-sighted brand of thinking. The fact is, effective government is
essential if democracy is to have any meaning.
Otherwise, Americans are voting for politicians who endorse policies as
solutions to major problems, run on those policies, get into office—and can’t
actually do anything.
Either the
policies don’t pass or, if they do, they are eviscerated and weakened to the
point that they have no impact. This is not democratic government. The people
are voting, but they are not getting what they want. They are not getting
anything at all. The glue that makes democracy real is effective government—for
it connects the policies that people vote on to the outcomes they actually get.
The proper
way to judge fast track, or indeed any constitutional amendment, is not to think
about Clinton and Trump. It is to think about the kinds of democratic
institutions we want for this nation—that would really work for this
nation—tomorrow, 10 years from now, a half century from now, whoever the
candidates may be and whatever their policies are.
Effective
government is fundamental to democracy. We can’t be short-sighted if we want our
democracy to function well. We need to think about the long term.
Q: Under
your plan, what role would checks and balances continue to play, and how likely
do you think it is that your plan would be approved?
Our proposal
barely affects the checks and balances that characterize American politics. All
of the legislative, judicial, and electoral constraints on presidential power
remain intact, as do the constitutional limits on government expressed in the
Bill of Rights.
By placing
presidents at the center of the legislative process, our proposal merely
ensures that they will play pivotal roles in seeing to it that policies are
designed to be effective solutions to the nation’s problems.
To succeed
in getting their policies adopted, however, they will need to rally the support
of majorities within both chambers of Congress. And if their policies are to
endure over time, they will need to pass muster with the courts and American
people.
Giving the
presidency permanent and universal fast track authority requires a
constitutional amendment. This, no doubt, is a heavy lift. But our proposal
expands upon an existing power, one with which the nation has a good deal of
very positive experience. It also comes at a time when public approval of
Congress is at historic lows.
And most
importantly, the incapacity of our government to solve very real problems is
currently generating all kinds of political unrest. The time is right, we think, for serious
conversation about institutional reform.
Q: What are
you working on now?
A: We are
both pushing forward on our respective research agendas. William is writing a series of academic
papers on Obama’s Race to the Top initiative and the sources of political
authority. Terry is advancing his longstanding research agenda on public sector
unions, as well as working on a book on power.
But
together, we’re already beginning to think about a follow-up to Relic. The
Constitution’s hold on our political imaginations and ambitions, we think, is
worthy of continued investigation. Stay tuned.
Q: Anything
else we should know?
A: As it
turns out, yes. In this election year,
what passes for political discourse can’t seem to see past Trump’s Twitter feed.
Come November, however, the nation will elect a new president, and our
attention—at long last—will return to the actual challenges of governance.
We would do
well to think critically about the capacity of our elected officials, whoever
they may be, to actually solve problems. For unless we do so, the kind of
anxiety and disaffection that has so dominated this election cycle will only
intensify.
--Interview with Deborah Kalb
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